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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 On March 25, 2013, North Carolina began issuing special driver’s 
licenses (N.C. licenses) to qualified undocumented immigrants protected 
from removal under Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA).1 The 
front of the license contains the words “NO LAWFUL STATUS” in bold red 
letters, conspicuously publicizing DACA grantees’ delicate immigration 
status.2 The key issue is whether states can publicize the immigration status 
of individuals who are protected from deportation by the federal government. 
DACA preempts the N.C. licenses because the N.C. licenses draw attention 
to DACA grantees’ immigration status in a way that frustrates the federal 
policy to integrate DACA grantees. 
On June 15, 2012, the Obama administration announced it would 
defer any removal action for qualified undocumented immigrants under 
DACA.3 DACA preserves administrative resources by refocusing removal 
efforts on “high priority” persons. 4  President Barack Obama stated that 
DACA protects individuals who “are Americans in their heart, in their 
minds, in every single way but . . . on paper,” by lifting “the shadow of 
deportation from these young people.” 5  DACA does not grant any 
immigration status but offers lawful presence in the U.S. and clears a path for 
qualified immigrants to work legally and obtain driver’s licenses.6 
According to recent statistics, forty-eight states permit DACA 
grantees to apply for driver’s licenses.7 Though some states were initially 
                                                        
1 Michael Hennessey, Licenses for DACA Qualifiers Pink Stripe to be Removed, 
WCTI 12 (Mar. 22, 2013, 7:40 PM), http://www.wcti12.com/news/Licenses-for-DACA-
qualifiers/-/13530444/19433972/-/dy8ys4/-/index.html. 
2 Id. 
3 See Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the 
Absence of Immigration Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter 
Obama’s Ruby Slippers], http://ssrn.com/abstract=2238741; U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on 
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United 
States as Children (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter Napolitano] (on file with the author). 
4 Napolitano, supra note 3. 
5 John Cushman Jr. & Julia Preston, Obama to Permit Young Migrants to 
Remain in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2012), www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/us/us-to-stop-
deporting-some-illegal-immigrants.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
6 Id.; See 8 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012). 
7 NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., ARE INDIVIDUALS GRANTED DEFERRED ACTION 
UNDER THE DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA) POLICY ELIGIBLE FOR 
STATE DRIVER’S LICENSES?, http://www.nilc.org/dacadriverslicenses.html (last updated June 
19, 2013); Larry Copeland, N.C.’s Immigrant Driver’s License Plan Sparks Protests, USA 
TODAY (Mar. 8, 2013), www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/07/ncs-immigrant-
drivers-license-plan-sparks-protests/1972119/. See also Amanda P. Beadle, States Move 
Forward to Allow Undocumented Immigrants to Drive Legally, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Apr. 
29, 2013), http://immigrationimpact.com/2013/04/29/states-move-forward-to-allow-undocu 
mented-immigrants-to-drive-legally/ (noting states’ increasing acceptance of providing 
undocumented immigrants without deferred action status driver’s licenses). 
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hesitant in issuing driver’s licenses to DACA grantees, only Arizona and 
Nebraska expressly prohibit DACA grantees from obtaining licenses.8  
North Carolina initially denied DACA grantees driver’s licenses, but 
eventually issued special driver’s licenses to DACA grantees.9 The original 
designs for the North Carolina licenses singled out DACA grantees with a 
bright pink stripe.10 After much controversy, North Carolina issued licenses 
to DACA grantees with “NO LAWFUL STATUS” in bold red letters on the 
face of the license without the pink stripe.11 
While DACA grantees are granted deferred action at the federal 
level, the attention drawn to an individual’s immigration status by the N.C. 
licenses is problematic at the local enforcement level. The N.C. licenses 
draw attention to the precarious immigration status of DACA grantees. This 
puts DACA grantees at risk of unnecessary detainment due to the interaction 
between state law enforcement and Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
§ 287(g) and Secured Communities (S-COMM) programs.12 
The N.C. licenses affect a significant number of individuals. As of 
March 14, 2013, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) received 469,530 applications, 338,334 of which are Mexican 
applicants.13 USCIS has approved 453,589 applications.14 Of the applicants, 
16,554 were North Carolina residents, the sixth most applicants from one                                                         
8 Copeland, supra note 7; NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., OVERVIEW OF STATE 
DRIVER’S LICENSE REQUIREMENTS FOR INDIVIDUALS GRANTED DEFERRED ACTION UNDER THE 
DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA) POLICY, http://www.nilc.org/ 
dacadriverslicensestbl.html (last updated Apr. 9, 2013); Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2012-06, 18 
Ariz. Admin. Reg. 2237 (Sept. 7, 2012), available at http://www.azsos.gov/aar/ 
2012/36/governor.pdf (noting the Arizona executive order expressly states that it does not 
recognize DACA’s validity and, therefore, does not recognize DACA grantees’ legal presence 
in the U.S.).  
9 Copeland, supra note 7.  
10 Id.  
11 Hennessey, supra note 1 (showing North Carolina also announced it will issue 
specially marked driver’s licenses for all noncitizens including lawful permanent residents in 
December 2013); See Bertrand M. Gutierrez, Planned N.C. Driver’s License Irks Some 
Noncitizens, WINSTON-SALEM J. (Feb. 22, 2013), www.journalnow.com/news/local/article_ 
65c8a826-7d56-11e2-9d3b-001a4bcf6878.html. 
12 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has phased out large parts 
of the § 287(g) program. The “task force” model, in which state police are deputized to 
enforce immigration laws in the regular course of their activities on the street have been 
suspended. Michele Waslin, ICE Scaling Back 287(g) Program, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Oct. 
19, 2012), http://immigrationimpact.com/2012/10/19/ice-scaling-back-287g-program/; Alan 
Gomez, Immigration Enforcement Program to be Shut Down, USA TODAY (Feb. 17, 2012, 
3:25 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-02-17/immigration-enforce 
ment-program/53134284/1. 
13 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD 
ARRIVALS PROCESS (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/ 
Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Ty
pes/DACA/daca-13-3-15.pdf (providing statistics from Aug. 15, 2012–Mar. 14, 2013). 
14 Id. 
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state.15 While comprehensive immigration reform seems on the horizon, the 
N.C. licenses will remain an issue unless any new law settles the 
immigration status of DACA grantees.16 
Other scholars have focused on a potential equal protection 
challenge to driver’s licenses such as the N.C. license.17 Given the Supreme 
Court’s focus on federalism and preemption in the immigration law context, 
this article analyzes N.C. driver’s licenses in light of the Supreme Court’s 
use of obstacle preemption in Arizona v. United States.18  
DACA preempts N.C. licenses because the licenses disrupt the 
federal government’s careful balance of policy goals to integrate qualified 
“low priority” undocumented immigrants and focus removal efforts on “high 
priority” criminals by drawing undue attention to DACA grantees’ lack of 
lawful status.19 Additionally, the N.C. licenses’ interaction with state “show 
me your papers” laws, § 287(g), and S-COMM exacerbates such disruption 
of federal policy goals because the “no lawful status” language on the N.C. 
licenses subjects DACA grantees to an increased risk of wrongful detention. 
Most troubling is how a N.C. license holder would fare in Arizona, where 
DACA grantees’ lawful presence is ignored. 20  Therefore, N.C. licenses 
would offer no protection from Arizona law enforcement.21                                                         
15 Id. 
16 Rosalind S. Helderman & Sean Sullivan, Bipartisan Group of Senators to 
Unveil Framework for Immigration Overhaul, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2013), 
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/bipartisan-group-of-senators-to-unveil-framework-for-
immigration-overhaul/2013/01/27/bdb04360-68bf-11e2-ada3-d86a4806d5ee_story.html; Dan 
Nowicki, ‘Amnesty’ Losing Emotional Punch in Immigration Debate, USA TODAY (June 19, 
2013), www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/19/amnesty-losing-emotional-punch-
immigration-debate/2567509/. Under the current bill, undocumented immigrants must wait ten 
years and pay certain fines before becoming a permanent resident. Nowicki, supra. Even if the 
bill is passed, the status of undocumented immigrants would not be immediately resolved. Id. 
17 See María Pabón López, More Than A License to Drive: State Restrictions on 
the Use of Driver’s Licenses by Noncitizens, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 91, 104 (2005) (examining 
several types of driver’s licenses that can be issued to noncitizens, including N.C. licenses, 
which Professor López describes as “branding”). Note that an equal protection challenge 
would offer substantive rights to affected immigrants and would not be vulnerable to changing 
political views, unlike the DACA program, which is vulnerable to shifting political views. 
18 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
19 See Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3; Ernest A. Young, Executive 
Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869 (2008); Peter Marguiles, Taking Care of Immigration 
Law: Presidential Stewardship, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers 
(Roger Williams University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 133, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2215255. 
20 The ACLU, the ACLU of Arizona, the National Immigration Law Center 
(NILC), and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), filed a 
suit challenging Governor Brewer’s executive order in the U.S. District Court in Phoenix on 
behalf of DACA grantees who were denied Arizona driver’s licenses. ACLU, American 
Dream Act Coalition, et al v. Brewer (Sept. 18, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-
rights/arizona-dream-act-coalition-et-al-v-brewer. The lawsuit asserts that Arizona’s executive 
order violates the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution by interfering with federal 
immigration law and also violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause by 
discriminating against certain non-citizens. Id. The Court held that Arizona did not have 
4
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Part II provides a background of DACA and the N.C. licenses.22 Part 
III provides a brief overview of Arizona v. United States and modern 
obstacle preemption jurisprudence. 23  Part IV begins by exploring the 
interaction between licenses and state law, § 287(g) and S-COMM, and how 
N.C. licenses are obstacle preempted.24 To illustrate the interaction between 
N.C. licenses with state and federal law, a hypothetical is set forth where a 
N.C. license holder is stopped by local law enforcement and is subsequently 
put through § 287(g) and S-COMM processes.25 Part IV then examines how 
Arizona law exacerbates the effect of the N.C. licenses.26 Finally, Part V 
concludes that the N.C. licenses are preempted, thus unconstitutional.27 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
A. The Creation of the DACA Program to Protect Qualified Individuals 
from Deportation  
DACA was created to protect qualified undocumented immigrants 
from removal and was intended to protect undocumented immigrants who 
are “Americans in their heart, in their minds, in every single way but one: on 
paper.”28 On June 15, 2012, the Obama administration announced that the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would exercise its prosecutorial 
discretion to defer action for qualified undocumented immigrants who 
arrived in the U.S. as children.29 
Janet Napolitano, the Secretary of Homeland Security, issued a 
memorandum instructing ICE and USCIS to defer removal action for 
qualified individuals for a renewable two-year period. 30  To qualify for 
DACA protection, individuals must meet each of the following criteria: 
(i) entered the U.S. before they turned sixteen; (ii) are not older than thirty-
one; (iii) have continuously resided in the United States since June 15, 2007, 
up to the present time; (iv) were physically present in the United States on                                                                                                                                   
rational basis to deny DACA grantees driver’s licenses, but it also denied the plaintiffs’ 
request for a preliminary injunction against the Arizona policy. Federal Court Says Arizona 
Violates Constitution by Denying Licenses to DREAMers, COMMON DREAMS (May 17, 2013), 
https://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2013/05/17 [hereinafter Arizona Violates 
Constitution]. 
21 See Complaint ¶¶ 44–49, Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. 2:12-cv-02546, 
2013 WL 2128315 (D. Az. May 16, 2012), 2012 WL 5952174; Ariz. Exec. Order 2012–06; 
Arizona Violates Constitution, supra note 20.  
22 See infra Part II.  
23 See infra Part III. 
24 See infra Part IV. 
25 See infra Part IV. 
26 See infra Part IV. 
27 See infra Part V. 
28 Cushman & Preston, supra note 5.  
29 Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3, at 15; Napolitano, supra note 3.  
30 Napolitano, supra note 3, at 1–3.  
5
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June 15, 2012, and at the time of making the DACA application; 
(v) graduated high school, attended college, or served in the military; and 
(vi) do not have a significant criminal background.31 DACA grantees are 
eligible for employment authorization and a Social Security number.32 
DHS has reiterated that DACA grantees are lawfully present, despite 
lacking formal immigration status.33 Lawful status is distinct from lawful 
presence. 34  An individual can lack lawful status but still be lawfully 
present. 35  Unlawful presence applies to an individual who is physically 
present in the U.S. without lawful status (i.e. a lawful permanent resident, an 
asylee or refugee, a visa holder, or a parolee).36 However, DHS can stop the 
accrual of unlawful presence of an individual without lawful status as a 
matter of prosecutorial discretion.37 In such a case, an individual can be 
lawfully present in the U.S. without lawful status. Accordingly, a DACA 
grantee will not accrue any unlawful presence once granted DACA status, 
although any unlawful presence prior to obtaining DACA status is not 
forgiven.38 
Generally, individuals who are unlawfully present are ineligible for 
federal public benefits.39 Such individuals may also be ineligible for state 
public benefits, but states have discretion to offer public benefits to 
unlawfully present individuals.40 
With lawful presence, DACA grantees can access state public 
benefits and various state licenses. 41  Providing access to state driver’s 
licenses is central to the Obama administration’s goal to integrate DACA 
                                                        
31 Id. 
32 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., CONSIDERATION OF DEFERRED 
ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS PROCESS—FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2013) [hereinafter USCIS FAQ], http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/ 
menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=3a4dbc4b04499310VgnVCM10
0000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=3a4dbc4b04499310VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD. 
33 Id. 
34 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(a)(1), 1641 (2012); Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, 
Acting Associate Director of USCIS, on Consolidation of Guidance Concerning Unlawful 
Presence for Purposes of Sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i) and 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)—Revision to and Re-
designation of Adjudicator’s Field Manual (AFM) Chapter 30.1(d) as Chapter 40.9 at 10 
(AFM Update AD 08-03) (May 6, 2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/ 
Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/2009/revision_redesign_AFM.PDF [hereinafter 
Neufeld]. 
35 Neufeld, supra note 34, at 9–10. 
36 Id. at 10; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15), 1182(d)(5), 1621(a)(1)(3), 1641 (2012). 
37 Neufeld, supra note 34, at 9–10. 
38 USCIS FAQ, supra note 32; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (2012) (noting 
“[n]o period of time in which an alien is under 18 years of age shall be taken into account in 
determining the period of unlawful presence”). 
39 See 8 U.S.C. § 1611 (2012). 
40 § 1621(a), (d). 
41 See § 1621(c). 
6
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grantees.42  Indeed, state driver's licenses are essentially de facto national 
identification cards and are vital to daily activities.43 Driver’s licenses are 
used to prove identity in many situations, including, but not limited to, 
opening bank accounts, cashing checks, and using credit cards.44 
DACA was announced in response to Congress’s inability to pass 
the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act.45 
In light of legislative inaction, law school professors outlined the legal 
authority for deferred action in a letter to President Obama and urged the 
President to take executive action.46 The letter explained that INA § 103(a) 
grants the Secretary of Homeland Security broad authority to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion, and deferred action is a form of prosecutorial 
discretion historically used by the executive branch.47 
DACA’s opponents question its legality.48 Kris Kobach, Kansas’s 
Secretary of State and the primary author of Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051 
(2010), better known as Arizona S.B. 1070, filed a complaint against the 
Secretary of Homeland Security and the director of ICE on behalf of ICE 
officers claiming that DACA is unconstitutional and violates administrative 
law procedural requirements.49 The State of Mississippi joined the complaint 
two months later.50 Despite the backlash, many undocumented immigrants 
are applying for deferred action.51 
DACA grantees, as immigrants without lawful status, are vulnerable 
to detention during investigation of their immigration status. Under § 287(g) 
and S-COMM, ICE may access DACA grantees’ immigration information                                                         
42 Kevin R. Johnson, Driver’s Licenses and Undocumented Immigrants: The 
Future of Civil Rights Law?, 5 NEV. L.J. 213, 221 (2004). 
43 Id. 
44 Paul L. Frantz, Undocumented Workers: State Issuance of Driver Licenses 
Would Create A Constitutional Conundrum, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505, 532 (2004). 
45 Cushman & Preston, supra note 5.  
46 See Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3, at 15. 
47 Letter from Immigration Law Professors, Executive Authority to Grant 
Administrative Relief to Dream Act Beneficiaries, to President Obama (May 28, 2012) (on 
file with author). 
48 Cushman & Preston, supra note 5; Andres Gonzalez & Alicia Caldwell, 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, Obama Immigration Program, Begins Taking 
Applications, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2012), www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/ 
08/15/deferred-action-for-childhood-arrivals_n_1778834.html. 
49 Complaint, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247, 2013 WL 1744422 
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2013), 2012 WL 3629252 (arguing DACA was enacted without proper 
notice and comment per the Administrative Procedure Act and in turn does not have the force 
of law and impedes DHS officers from enforcing INA § 235).  
50 Amended Complaint, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247, 2013 WL 
1744422 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2013), 2012 WL 5199509. 
51 As of Aug. 31, 2013, USCIS has received 588,725 applications, 433,318 of 
which are Mexican applicants. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DACA MONTHLY 
REPORT 1–2 (Sep. 11, 2013), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/ 
Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Types/DACA/
daca-13-9-11.pdf. USCIS has approved 455,455 applications. Id. There were 19,876 
applicants residing in North Carolina, the seventh most applicants from one state. Id. 
7
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for removal purposes. Under INA § 287(g), states in current contracts with 
DHS only implement the Detention Model, where local jail officers are 
trained to screen inmates for potential immigration violations.52 If the local 
jail officers believe an individual is removable, they can then inform ICE, 
which may issue a detainer. 53  Under S-COMM, the fingerprints of 
individuals arrested by local law enforcement are checked against the FBI 
criminal history database and the DHS biometric databases.54 If the federal 
database shows that the individual is removable, it will issue a “detainer” to 
local law enforcement requesting the arrested individual be detained until 
ICE agents interview and determine whether or not to transfer the individual 
to ICE custody.55  An arrest for any infraction, no matter how minor, is 
sufficient to trigger a § 287(g) detainer or S-COMM database check.56 No 
conviction is necessary for ICE to issue a detainer.57  
State and local law enforcement act as gatekeepers with the initial 
discretion to determine how to proceed with an arrested individual under 
both § 287(g) and S-COMM.58 As an illustration of the importance of local 
law enforcement’s discretion, police decisions to stop drivers for minor 
traffic violations have frequently led to detention of Latino immigrants under 
the § 287(g) program.59                                                         
52 Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FY 2012: ICE 
Announces Year-End Removal Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key Priorities and Issues New 
National Detainer Guidance to Further Focus Resources (Dec. 21, 2012), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1212/121221washingtondc2.htm#statement. 
53 Id.; see also U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FACT SHEET: 
DELEGATION OF IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY SECTION 287(G) IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY 
ACT, (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (showing five 
counties in North Carolina are currently enrolled in § 287(g)). 
54 U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES, 
http://www.ice.gov/secure_ communities/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2013). 
55 Edgar Aguilasocho, Misplaced Priorities: The Failure of Secure Communities 
in Los Angeles County (University of California Irvine Legal Studies Research Paper No. 118, 
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2012283. 
56 Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration 
Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil—Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 
1851 (2011). 
57 Aguilasocho, supra note 55; See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/sc-activated2.pdf (last updated July 31, 2012) (noting that, as of July 2012, 
97% of U.S. jurisdictions have activated S-COMM, including every North Carolina county 
resulting in the removal of 4,085 undocumented immigrants). 
58 Motomura, supra note 56, at 1856. 
59 Angela M. Banks, The Curious Relationship Between “Self-Deportation” 
Policies and Naturalization Rates, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1149, 1181–82 (2012). ICE 
statistics contain the following information:  
 Thirty percent of all ICE detainers issued nationwide in 2010 
pursuant to 287(g) agreements were based on traffic offenses . . . . These 
numbers suggest that the police officers responsible for the most traffic-
based arrests leading to ICE detainers were patrol officers with no specific 
authority or mandate to enforce immigration law. Patrol officers do not 
need 287(g) authority to support immigration enforcement; they just need 
8
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B. Background on Driver’s Licenses for Undocumented Immigrants 
 
 Generally, states have wide latitude in determining whether to issue 
driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants.60 Even before September 11, 
2001, several states prohibited undocumented immigrants from obtaining 
driver’s licenses to discourage immigration. 61  After September 11, state 
efforts to deny undocumented immigrants driver’s licenses greatly 
increased.62 
The lack of a driver’s license directly threatens the livelihood of 
immigrants because driving is the most important mode of transportation in 
the U.S. 63  To meet their daily needs, some undocumented immigrants 
continue to drive without licenses and are often unable to obtain automobile 
insurance because of their unlicensed status.64 Consequently, there are safety 
concerns regarding undocumented immigrants who are unable to legally 
drive.65 
Moreover, as noted previously, driver’s licenses issued by the states 
are essentially de facto national identification cards.66 The denial of driver’s 
licenses injures immigrants by exacerbating fears of arrest and deportation, 
limiting access to jobs, and generally increasing vulnerability to exploitation 
in the workplace and elsewhere.67 Indeed, the lack of a license more likely 
relegates a person to the secondary labor market, with low wages and poor 
conditions.68 
 
C. Background of North Carolina Driver’s Licenses and Recent State 
Legislation 
 
North Carolina wavered several times between issuing and not 
issuing licenses to DACA grantees.69 The North Carolina Division of Motor                                                                                                                                   
to operate within a jurisdiction in which the immigration status of all 
arrested individuals is checked. 
Id. See also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF TENN., CONSEQUENCES AND COSTS: LESSONS 
LEARNED FROM DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE’S JAIL MODEL 287(G) PROGRAM, (2012), 
http://www.aclu-tn.org/pdfs/287g(F).pdf (reporting Tennessee law enforcement making 
pretextual arrests and jailing individuals for § 287(g) jail program purposes). 
60 See Johnson, supra note 42, at 219.  
61 López, supra note 17, at 95. 
62 Id. at 96. 
63 Id. at 96–97.  
64 Id. at 97–98. 
65 Id. 
66 Johnson, supra note 42, at 221. 
67 Id. at 221–22. 
68 Id. 
69 Franco Ordoñez, N.C. Switches Stance on Driver’s Licenses for Illegal 
Immigrants, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Jan. 11, 2013), www.charlotteobserver.com/ 
2013/01/11/3778691/nc-switches-stance-on-licenses.html; Copeland, supra note 7; North 
Carolina Suspends Issuing Driver’s Licenses to DREAMers, FOX NEWS (Jan. 9, 2013), 
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Vehicles (N.C. DMV) ultimately decided to issue licenses to DACA grantees 
after the state Attorney General explained that “lawful presence” under 
DACA comports with federal law as well as the state’s driver’s license 
laws. 70  North Carolina’s Department of Transportation (N.C. DOT) 
announced that it would issue DACA grantees licenses with a pink stripe and 
the words “NO LAWFUL STATUS” and “LIMITED TERM” starting on 
March 25, 2013.71 
Republican Governor of North Carolina Pat McCrory called the pink 
stripes “a pragmatic compromise.”72 The N.C. DOT maintained that the pink 
stripes were necessary to combat fraud, specifically voter fraud.73 Currently, 
the back of issued North Carolina licenses discreetly indicates that a license 
holder is not a U.S. citizen by stating the validity period of the noncitizen’s 
authorized presence.74 
DACA applicants expressed concerns about being singled out on 
account of their immigration status.75 Religious groups in North Carolina 
also criticized the state’s decision to issue the pink licenses and have 
described the licenses as “punitive.”76 
 In light of such controversy, the N.C. DOT removed the pink stripe 
days before March 25, 2013.77 The redesigned licenses issued to DACA 
grantees still state “NO LAWFUL STATUS” in bold red letters on the front 
of the license.78 To obtain licenses, DACA grantees need to demonstrate                                                                                                                                   
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2013/01/09/n-carolina-suspends-issuing-driver-
licenses-to-dreamers/. 
70 Copeland, supra note 7. The Office of North Carolina Attorney General Roy 
Cooper provided that under state statute, the N.C. DMV is required to issue driver’s licenses 
to applicants with legal presence in the U.S. Id. The Attorney General recognized that DACA 
granted lawful presence without providing any formal immigration status. Id. Thus, the 
Attorney General concluded that DACA grantees are lawfully present for the purposes of state 
law, therefore they meet the state statutory requirement of legal presence for driver’s licenses. 
Id. 
71 Id.; Gutierrez, supra note 11. 
72 Kim Severson, North Carolina to Give Some Immigrants Driver’s Licenses, 
with a Pink Stripe, N.Y. TIMES (March 5, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/03/06/us/north-
carolina-to-give-some-immigrants-drivers-licenses-with-a-pink-stripe.html (noting it is not 
clear what points are “compromised” according to Governor McCrory). Given that DACA 
grantees are lawfully present for a limited duration, they are presumably entitled to state 
benefits, such as driver’s licenses for the same duration. Id. 
73 Gutierrez, supra note 11. 
74 Id. 
75 Severson, supra note 72. 
76 Id. 
77 North Carolina: Pink Licenses Dropped, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2013), 
www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/us/north-carolina-pink-licenses-dropped.html; Hennessey, 
supra note 1 (explaining that the N.C. DOT removed the pink stripe to ensure that it would 
meet the Mar. 25, 2013 deadline). 
78 Hennessey, supra note 1; Pink Stripes Dropped From Driver’s Licenses for 
Illegal Immigrants, WRAL (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.wral.com/pink-stripe-dropped-from-
driver-s-licenses-for-illegal-immigrants/12252934/ (noting North Carolina plans to issue these 
licenses in December 2013); see also Colleen Jenkins, Immigrants Decry ‘Scarlet Letter’ 
10
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DACA status. 79  As of March 27, 2013, 693 DACA grantees in North 
Carolina received driver’s licenses, permits, or identification cards.80 
On April 10, 2013, North Carolina House Republicans took a further 
step and introduced H.B. 786. The bill proposed driver’s licenses for 
undocumented immigrants.81 The bill also proposed the addition of § 15A-
506 to the North Carolina General Statutes, which would allow law 
enforcement officers to check the immigration status of anyone they stop and 
detain them for up to twenty-four hours. 82  Recently, the bill’s sponsors 
offered an amendment to the bill requesting the Department of Public Safety 
study the ideas proposed in the bill. 83  The state agency will submit its 
findings and recommendations to a legislative oversight committee by March 
2014.84                                                                                                                                   
Driver’s Licenses in N.C., THOMAS REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Mar. 14, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/14/us-usa-immigration-licenses-idUSBRE92D0TL20 
130314. Alabama will also issue specially marked driver’s licenses to DACA grantees, but 
unlike the North Carolina licenses, driver’s licenses of all noncitizens, including lawful 
permanent residents will be identically marked with “FN.” Id. Thus, DACA grantees are not 
distinguished like they are in North Carolina. Id. 
79 N.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DACA FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, 
http://www.ncdot.gov/download/dmv/DACA/DACA_FAQs_English.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 
2013), (noting, per the N.C. DMV’s website, a DACA grantee must present proof of “lawful 
status,” which likely means any USCIS receipt notices of approval demonstrating DACA 
status). The N.C. DOT also announced plans to issue special driver’s licenses for all 
noncitizens, including lawful permanent residents Id.; see Gutierrez, supra note 11; see also 
Jenkins, supra note 78. 
80 Kellen Moore, No Local DACA Participants Seek Licenses, WATAUGA 
DEMOCRAT (Mar. 29, 2013), www2.wataugademocrat.com/News/story/No-local-DACA-
participants-seek-licenses-id-010952. 
81 H.B. 786, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013); Rebecca Leber, North 
Carolina GOP Files Arizona Style “Show Me Your Papers” Bill (Apr. 12, 2013, 10:30 AM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/04/12/1855831/north-carolina-arizona-immigration-bill/ 
(showing undocumented immigrants who have lived in the state for at least one year may 
obtain driver’s licenses). The licenses given to undocumented immigrants, however, will be 
different from regular driver’s licenses and will be even more distinct than the N.C. licenses 
for DACA grantees. Leber, supra. The licenses will be vertical and contain the cardholder’s 
fingerprint. Id. 
82 H.R. 786; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACLU: N.C. BILL WOULD LEAD TO 
RACIAL PROFILING (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights-racial-justice/aclu-
nc-bill-would-lead-racial-profiling (showing North Carolina republicans seek to adopt a 
“show me your papers” law akin to Arizona’s). The bill would also make it harder for 
undocumented immigrants to post bail, require anyone who is undocumented and arrested to 
pay the cost of their detention, and would allow law enforcement to impound and seize the 
vehicles of undocumented drivers. Id. Additionally, North Carolina driver’s license applicants 
must present proof of residency, which currently can be satisfied by “Immigration and 
Naturalization Services” documents or a Matricula Consular issued by the Mexican Consulate, 
but the bill prohibits the use of a Matricula Consular for such purposes. Id. 
83 NC Immigration Bill Turned Mostly Into a Study, WSCO TV (July 17, 2013, 
6:04 AM), http://www.wsoctv.com/news/news/local/nc-immigration-bill-turned-mostly-study/ 
nYsj6/ (explaining the bill has been transformed into an informational research and study bill 
rather than actual legislation). 
84 Id. 
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III.  OVERVIEW OF ARIZONA V. UNITED STATES AND THE 
PREEMPTION DOCTRINE 
 
A. General Background on Preemption Analysis and Case Law  
The Supreme Court has recognized that federal power over 
immigration is plenary and exclusive in some instances.85 The Supremacy 
Clause provides that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land . . . .”86 Accordingly, the federal government may preempt otherwise 
valid state law.87 
Preemption can be express or implied.88 Express preemption occurs 
when federal law specifically states that it precludes a state or locality from 
regulating a particular field.89 Implied preemption includes field and conflict 
preemption.90 Field preemption exists when the federal government creates a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme that crowds out state legislation in a 
particular field.91 Courts generally adopt a presumption against preemption 
where Congress acts in a field that states traditionally occupy.92 
Conflict preemption occurs when there is a direct conflict between 
federal and state law making it impossible to comply with both federal and 
state law.93 Obstacle preemption is a subset of conflict preemption existing 
when state law creates an obstacle to a federal law’s policy goals and 
objectives.94 The Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona offers guidance as to 
how the N.C. licenses are obstacle preempted under obstacle preemption 
jurisprudence prior to Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting.95  
 
B. Obstacle Preemption Jurisprudence Pre-Whiting 
 
In Hines v. Davidowitz, the Court relied on legislative history to hold 
that Pennsylvania’s Alien Registration Act was an obstacle to the federal                                                         
85 See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 26 (1982). 
86 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
87 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500. 
88 See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (“Pre-
emption may be either expressed or implied and is compelled whether Congress’ command is 
explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.”) 
(internal quotations and citation omitted). 
89 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1824); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 
(1912); California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989). 
90 Lauren Gilbert, Immigrant Laws, Obstacle Preemption and the Lost Legacy of 
McCulloch, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 159 (2012) [hereinafter Immigrant Laws]. 
91 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citation omitted). 
92 Id. 
93 Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963). 
94 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 65 (1941). 
95 See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2492; See also David A. Martin, Reading Arizona, 
98 Va. L. Rev. 41 (2012). 
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government’s “plainly manifested” purpose.96 The state law required adult 
noncitizens to register annually, pay a fee, carry their alien identification card 
at all times, and show it upon request.97 Noncitizens who failed to register or 
carry their card were subject to fines. 98 A year after Pennsylvania passed the 
law, Congress enacted the federal Alien Registration Act. The Act did not 
require noncitizens to carry a registration card, but criminalized willful 
failure to register.99 
In striking down the state law, the Court stated that rules and 
regulations touching on “the rights, privileges, obligations or burdens of 
aliens” implicate the federal foreign affairs power. 100  Moreover, “states 
cannot, inconsistently with the purposes of Congress, conflict or interfere 
with, curtail or complement the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary 
regulations.”101 The Court balanced the federal government’s policy goals 
against the effects of the state law and emphasized that the federal 
government sought to “protect the personal liberties of law-abiding aliens 
through one uniform national registration system, and to leave them free 
from the possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance that 
might not only affect our international relations but might also generate the 
very disloyalty which the law has intended guarding against.”102 
Similarly, in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, the Court 
held that a Presidential executive order obstacle preempted a Massachusetts 
statute.103 The Court focused on the executive intent and broad foreign policy 
concerns underlying the executive order to determine that the state law 
interfered with the President’s authority to speak on foreign policy matters 
which impeded the development and execution of a national policy 
concerning Burma (Myanmar).104 
The Supreme Court has held that a state law may be an obstacle to 
achieving the purposes of a federal law when it balances policy goals 
                                                        
96 Hines, 312 U.S. at 74; See also Immigrant Laws, supra note 90, at 202 (“Hines 
v. Davidowitz frequently has been categorized in the literature as a field preemption case, 
even though the Court used the language of obstacle preemption in striking down 
Pennsylvania’s registration requirements.”). 
97 Hines, 312 U.S. at 5960. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 60–61  
100 Id at 62–63.  
101 Id. at 66–67.  
102 Id. at 74 (emphasis added). 
103 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
104 Id. at 376–84 (“The state Act undermines the President’s capacity, in this 
instance for effective diplomacy. It is not merely that the differences between the state and 
federal Acts in scope and type of sanctions threaten to complicate discussions; they 
compromise the very capacity of the President to speak for the Nation with one voice in 
dealing with other governments.”) (emphasis added). The Court examined congressional 
intent in delegating power to the executive to handle relations and economic sanctions with 
Burma. Id. 
13
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differently than federal law.105 In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 
Inc., the Court found that the state law at issue was preempted because it 
struck the balance between “the encouragement of invention and free 
competition in unpatented ideas” differently than federal law.106 Similarly, in 
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., the Court held that tort claims 
under state law for misrepresenting products to the FDA were obstacle 
preempted because the “balance sought by the Administration can be skewed 
by allowing fraud-on-the-FDA claims under state tort law.”107 
In Lozano v. Hazelton, the Third Circuit adopted a similar balancing 
approach in examining obstacle preemption in the immigration context.108 
The court then found that the local ordinance regulating employment of 
undocumented immigrants and prohibiting rentals to undocumented 
immigrants was obstacle preempted.109 The court examined Congress’ efforts 
to carefully balance multiple policy objectives by extensively searching the 
legislative history and the overall structure of the Immigration and Reform 
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).110 Ultimately, the court found that the Hazleton 
ordinance chose to prioritize only one of the various policies considered by 
Congress and disregarded Congress’ other objectives.111 
 
C. The Supreme Court’s Decisions in Whiting and Arizona 
 
However, in Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, the Court 
deviated from the fact-intensive balancing.112 The Court examined the Legal 
Arizona Workers Act (LAWA), which provides that the licenses of “state 
employers who knowingly or intentionally employ unauthorized aliens” may 
be revoked under certain circumstances. 113  LAWA also requires every 
employer “[to] verify the employment eligibility of the employee by using E-
Verify . . . .”114                                                         
105 See, e.g., Arizona, 489 U.S. at 157–58; Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 
529 U.S. 861 (2000) (noting the Court held that such a tort action would frustrate the DOT’s 
goal of permitting automobile manufacturers wide discretion in choosing safety devices); 
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
106 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 157–58 (showing the Court examined the state 
statute which prohibited the use of a particular process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls 
conflicted with federal law that promoted free competition in unpatented areas). 
107 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001) 
(determining that it would undermine federal policy to allow state law tort claimants to negate 
the FDA’s finding that the manufacturer made a valid application for FDA approval). 
108 Immigrant Laws, supra note 90, at 176.  
109 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 210 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. 
Ct. 2958 (2011), remanded to 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013). 
110 Lozano, 620 F.3d at 210 (noting “it is indisputable that Congress went to 
considerable lengths in enacting IRCA to achieve a careful balance among its competing 
policy objectives of effectively deterring employment of unauthorized aliens. . . ”). 
111 Id. at 219. 
112 See infra Part III.  
113 Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011). 
114 Id. at 1976–77.  
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The Court found the state law at issue was not preempted.115 The 
Court held that the provision revoking business licenses was not expressly 
preempted. 116  The Court broadly interpreted “licensure” in the business 
context and held that LAWA fell within the scope of IRCA’s savings 
clause.117 The Court found it significant that Arizona relied solely on the 
federal government’s determination of who is an unauthorized individual, 
which in turn was not in contention with federal law.118 Finally, the Court 
held that the LAWA licensure provision was not obstacle preempted and 
refused to engage in a “freewheeling . . . inquiry into whether a state statute 
is in tension with federal objectives” to determine whether federal law 
preempted LAWA.119 
In stark contrast to the Whiting Court’s reluctance to utilize a 
searching obstacle preemption analysis, the Court in Arizona relied on 
legislative history to find congressional intent obstacle preempted two of the 
four challenged provisions of S.B. 1070.120 Indeed, the Court in Arizona 
seemed to revisit the broad pre-Whiting obstacle preemption analysis.121 
First, the Court held that the portion of the law criminalizing failure 
to carry immigration documents was field preempted.122 Second, the Court 
stated that “even complementary state regulation is impermissible” where 
Congress has adopted a comprehensive regulatory scheme.123 
The Court then relied on obstacle preemption to uphold a 
preliminary injunction against the provision of the law that imposed criminal 
penalties on immigrants who work without employment authorization.124 The 
Court examined the text, structure, and legislative history of IRCA to 
determine that the state law criminalizing immigrant workers was an obstacle 
to the regulatory scheme enacted by Congress.125 The Court held that the 
provision interfered with “the careful balance struck by Congress with 
respect to unauthorized employment of aliens. Although § 5(C) attempts to 
achieve one of the same goals as federal law . . . it involves a conflict in the 
method of enforcement.”126 The Court in Arizona deviated from Whiting and 
examined a wide range of legislative background materials, including                                                         
115 Id. at 1985–87. 
116 Id. at 1981. 
117 Id. at 1980. 
118 Id. at 1981. 
119 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985. 
120 Martin, supra note 95, at 43 (noting that the Arizona Court’s reliance on 
obstacle preemption was a surprise, particularly because the Arizona law in Whiting, which 
was far more specific and closer to federal law, managed to withstand an obstacle preemption 
challenge). 
121 See infra Part III. 
122 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503. 
123 Id. at 2502. 
124 Id. at 2505. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
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Congressional studies, recommendations, and hearings to ascertain the 
federal objectives underlying IRCA.127 
The section allowing state law enforcement to arrest noncitizens who 
commit “removable offenses” without a warrant was similarly struck down 
as the Court held that Arizona law enforcement would have greater authority 
to enforce immigration laws than federal immigration officers.128 The Court 
examined a guidance memorandum issued by DHS to determine what factors 
the federal government perceived to be crucial in determining whether to 
prosecute a removable individual and found that the state law was an 
obstacle to federal objectives.129 In striking down the provision, the Court 
expressed concerns that the law “could [result in] unnecessary harassment of 
some aliens (for instance, a veteran, college student, or someone assisting 
with a criminal investigation) whom federal officials determine should not be 
removed,” presenting an obstacle to the federal enforcement scheme.130 
The Court found no facial flaw in the “show me your papers” law, 
but stated that it could be challenged as applied, particularly in situations 
involving racial profiling and violations of the Fourth Amendment.131 The 
Court left the door open for future challenges to “show me your papers” 
laws.132 
 
IV.  NORTH CAROLINA LICENSES ARE OBSTACLE PREEMPTED 
BY DACA BECAUSE THEY HINDER FEDERAL POLICY 
OBJECTIVES 
 
The central issue regarding the N.C. licenses is whether states can 
publicize the immigration status of individuals protected from removal by 
the federal government, drawing attention to the individuals’ immigration 
statuses. As a general matter, states have the authority to issue driver’s 
                                                        
127 Id. at 2504–05. The opinion held that: 
 In the end, IRCA’s framework reflects a considered judgment that 
making criminals out of aliens engaged in unauthorized work—aliens who 
already face the possibility of employer exploitation because of their 
removable status—would be inconsistent with federal policy and 
objectives . . . . Under § 5(C) of S.B. 1070, Arizona law would interfere 
with the careful balance struck by Congress with respect to unauthorized 
employment of aliens. Although § 5(C) attempts to achieve one of the 
same goals as federal law—the deterrence of unlawful employment—it 
involves a conflict in the method of enforcement. 
Id. (citations omitted).  
128 Id. at 2506. 
129 Id. at 2505. 
130 Id. at 2506 (emphasis added). 
131 Id. at 2510. 
132 Id. 
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licenses. 133  However, federal legislation may preempt state legislation 
regarding driver’s licenses.134  
The Supreme Court has recognized that it is within the absolute 
discretion of the executive branch to not pursue immigration enforcement 
action.135 As such, any exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the executive 
branch may preempt otherwise valid state legislation regarding driver’s 
licenses. In the immigration context, DHS frequently exercises its 
prosecutorial discretion to “defer action.”136 DHS has used “deferred action” 
in various contexts to ensure efficient resource allocation with an eye toward 
humanitarian concerns.137 Examples of individuals receiving deferred action 
include survivors of domestic violence with approved VAWA self-petitions 
who are not immediately eligible to adjust and certain widows of U.S. 
citizens who are ineligible for immigration status.138 DACA is merely an 
extension of DHS’s policy to not remove “low priority” aliens.139 Indeed, 
Napolitano’s memo adopted measures to ensure federal resources are not 
wasted on removing “low priority” DACA grantees.140 
As a threshold matter, before examining N.C. licenses under the 
preemption framework, it should be noted that DACA is not legislation 
created by Congress, nor is it a federal regulation created from formal 
                                                        
133 See López, supra note 17. 
134 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
135 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). “This Court has recognized 
on several occasions over many years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, 
whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s 
absolute discretion.” Id. 
136 Napolitano, supra note 3, at 2–3. 
137 Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3, at 7, 37. See also Lennon v. Immigration 
& Naturalization Serv., 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1975); 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) (2012). Arguably, 
one of the more prominent examples of “deferred action,” then termed “nonpriority status.” 
Id. (noting John Lennon was found to be eligible for deferred action despite a prior drug 
conviction). 
138 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS ESTABLISHES INTERIM RELIEF FOR WIDOWS OF 
U.S. CITIZENS (June 9, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/06/09/dhs-establishes-interim-
relief-widows-us-citizens.  
139 See Napolitano, supra note 3, at 1; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. of 
ICE, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with Civil Immigration Enforcement 
Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 
2011) (on file with the author) (setting forth the different priority levels of removable 
individuals and stating that that only higher priority level individuals should be pursued and 
removed); Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. of ICE, on Civil Immigration Enforcement: 
Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (Mar. 2, 2011) (explaining 
the focus of enforcement resources on high priority individuals); Memorandum from John 
Morton, Dir. of ICE, on Guidance Regarding the Handling of Removal Proceedings of Aliens 
with Pending or Approved Applications or Petitions (Aug. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Morton 
Memo] (terminating removal proceedings of persons with pending applications for status in 
certain instances and essentially directing ICE not to use enforcement resources on “low 
priority” persons). 
140 Napolitano, supra note 3, at 1. 
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rulemaking processes per the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).141  A 
potential issue in determining the viability of the DACA program is whether 
the Obama administration overstepped constitutional bounds by announcing 
the policy.142 
Indeed, recent litigation brought forth by Kris Kobach, ICE officials, 
and the State of Mississippi seeks to dismantle the DACA program by 
arguing that it is unconstitutional.143 Scholars have also expressed concerns 
regarding the constitutionality of preemption by federal agencies and the 
executive branch.144 
However, Professor Lauren Gilbert argued DACA falls within the 
policy exception to rule making under the APA.145 Furthermore, she argued 
that DACA is the result of the Secretary of Homeland Security’s broad 
authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) to establish rules and regulations to 
further the goals of the INA.146 Professor David A. Martin also argued that 
the plain language of the INA does not prevent DHS from exercising its 
prosecutorial discretion through DACA.147                                                         
141 Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3, at 28. 
142 See Jill E. Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens of Immigration Law, 
64 ADMIN. L. REV. 565, 572 (2012) (noting “Nonlegislative rules” are nonbinding and do not 
have the force of law, while legislative rules are binding and have the force of law). Generally, 
legislative rules create a “new law” that results in a substantive change. Id. There are various 
criteria for determining whether an agency document (i.e. policy memoranda) is indeed 
binding. Id. (noting the various procedural concerns that nonlegislative rules raises, 
particularly in the immigration law context). William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 
53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1322 (2001) (providing a broad overview of the rulemaking process 
in administrative law); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001); see Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
143 See Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3, at 28; Amended Complaint, supra 
note 50 (arguing that DACA was enacted without proper notice and comment per the APA, 
does not have the force of law, and improperly impedes DHS officers from enforcing INA 
§ 235); see also Amended Complaint, supra note 50, ¶ 50 (showing Plaintiff Doebler faced a 
three-day suspension for arresting and processing an alien for a hearing rather than exercising 
the “prosecutorial discretion” commanded by his supervisors). 
144 Young, supra note 19, at 878 (“When executive actors add preemptive 
mandates not clearly set forth in the underlying statute, the notice and deliberation facilitated 
by clear textual statement is lacking.”). 
145 Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3, at 27–28 (explaining the DACA 
program is a “general statement of policy” rooted in the “foreign affairs” exception to the 
formal rulemaking process per the APA). Thus, even if DACA is indeed a binding rule, the 
executive branch did not violate rulemaking procedures by foregoing the notice and comment 
process. Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
146 Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3, at 28; see 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3). “[The 
Secretary] shall establish such regulations; prescribe such forms of bond, reports, entries, and 
other papers; issue such instructions; and perform such other acts as he deems necessary for 
carrying out his authority under the provisions of this chapter.” § 1103(a)(3). 
147 See David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The 
Legal and Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 167 (2012) 
(arguing that not only does DHS have broad prosecutorial discretion under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1103(a), but the agency has broad discretion to not remove otherwise removable individuals 
under INA § 235). Professor Martin addresses the arguments Kris Kobach set forth in Crane 
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For the purposes of examining N.C. licenses under the preemption 
framework, it is assumed that DACA does not violate any provisions of the 
APA.148 It is further assumed that DACA is not the product of an improper 
delegation of power and is otherwise constitutional.149 This article adopts the 
argument that DACA was created pursuant to the executive branch’s broad 
discretion under 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3).150 
 
A. North Carolina Licenses Are Not Expressly Preempted by Any Federal 
Statute  
Express preemption occurs when Congress plainly declares a federal 
law’s preemptive effect, usually through an express preemption provision.151 
In such cases, the Court focuses “on the plain wording of the [express 
preemption] clause,” as it is considered the “best evidence of Congress’ pre-
emptive intent.”152 
Based on Whiting, the N.C. licenses are not expressly preempted. 
The Whiting Court only interpreted “licenses” in the context of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324a, which governs employment of undocumented immigrants.153 The 
IRCA provision at issue in Whiting contained an express savings clause for 
                                                                                                                                  
and ultimately concludes DHS properly exercised its broad discretion as an enforcement 
agency. Id. Professor Martin dismisses the argument that individual ICE officers are 
necessarily bound to removing individuals under INA § 235, even though DHS has already 
exercised its prosecutorial discretion. Id. 
148 See Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3; Marguiles, supra note 19; Young, 
supra note 19; Paul E. Mcgreal, Some Rice with Your Chevron?: Presumption and Deference 
in Regulatory Preemption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 845 (1995) (providing further 
analysis of the federalism and administrative law issues pertaining to DACA and federal 
agencies in general). 
149 See Marguiles, supra note 19 (arguing the validity of DACA cannot be fully 
explained by the executive exercise of prosecutorial discretion, instead DACA is justified by 
the President’s power to protect “intending citizens” from violations of law by the States). 
This Presidential “stewardship” arises from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Id.; Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3, at 22 
(noting it is arguable that the language of INA § 103(a) pushes the limits of the non-delegation 
doctrine as it may not provide an “intelligible principle” for executive action per Whitman v. 
American Trucking Associations, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001)). 
150 See Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3. This paper will adopt Professor 
Gilbert’s argument. 
151 Immigrant Laws, supra note 90, at 159. 
152 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62 (2002) (holding the express 
preemption clause of the Federal Boat Safety Act did not expressly preempt common law tort 
claims); see also Geier, 529 U.S. 861 (holding the express preemption clause of the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act did not expressly preempt common law tort claims). 
153 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1973. 
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business licenses.154 The Court broadly interpreted “licenses” in the federal 
statute savings clause to find that LAWA was not preempted.155 
The language of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a is inapplicable to driver’s licenses. 
No provision in the INA expressly prohibits the N.C. licenses. The 
Napolitano memorandum does not expressly require states to issue driver’s 
licenses with uniformity.156  The only federal statute that defines driver’s 
licenses is 49 U.S.C. § 30301, which states that a “motor vehicle operator’s 
license” is “a license issued by a State authorizing an individual to operate a 
motor vehicle on public streets, roads, or highways.”157  Unlike 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324a, the plain language of 49 U.S.C. § 30301 does not expressly address 
the type of immigration information on the face of the N.C. licenses.158 Thus, 
it would seem that federal law does not expressly preempt the N.C. licenses, 
as the language of the federal law does not directly address the publication of 
immigration status.159 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
154 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2012) (preempting “any State or local law imposing 
civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who 
employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens”). 
155 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1980. 
156 Napolitano, supra note 3, at 1–3. 
157 49 U.S.C. § 30301(5) (2012). 
158 Id.  
159 REAL ID Act of 2005 § 202, H.R. 1268, Pub. L. 109-13 (providing a proposed 
note to 49 U.S.C. § 30301 detailing how state driver’s licenses and identification documents 
should be issued). Section 202(c)(2)(B)(viii) contemplates a situation where states issue 
driver’s licenses to people with deferred action status. Id. Section 202(c)(2)(C) provides that 
people with temporary status (i.e. deferred action status) may receive a temporary driver’s 
license valid for the individual’s period of authorized stay or one year if the an individual is 
authorized to stay in the U.S. indefinitely. Id. Interestingly, section 202(c)(2)(C)(iii) provides 
that “[a] temporary driver’s license or temporary identification card issued pursuant to this 
subparagraph shall clearly indicate that it is temporary and shall state the date on which it 
expires.” Id. But, it is unclear how this note would impact the preemption analysis. The 
language of § 202(c) does not seem to expressly preempt the N.C. licenses, because it does not 
address the type of immigration information that is permitted on driver’s licenses. But see 
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, No. 3:04-0613, 2005 WL 2034935 (M.D. 
Tenn. Aug. 23, 2005) (finding that the REAL ID Act impliedly preempted a state statute 
which provided that the “[D]epartment [of Safety] shall not accept matricula consular cards as 
proof of identification for driver license application and issuance purposes” as the REAL ID 
Act set forth guidance for documents that are acceptable for “federal purposes”). See also 
Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Countdown to Real ID (Apr. 18, 2013), 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/transport/count-down-to-real-id.aspx; 6 C.F.R. § 37 
(providing applicable rules for states that issue driver’s licenses for use by federal 
government). 
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B. North Carolina Licenses Are Obstacle Preempted Because the Licenses 
Disrupt the Federal Government’s Policy Objectives and Interfere with the 
Federal Government’s Allocation of Resources 
 
Even though federal law doesn’t expressly preempt the N.C. 
licenses, implied preemption may still apply. As discussed above, the 
Supreme Court’s obstacle preemption jurisprudence focuses on the federal 
government’s balancing of policy goals.160 In Arizona, the Supreme Court 
utilized a broad analysis of legislative history to determine the federal 
government’s balance of policy goals.161  
 
1. North Carolina Licenses Disrupt the Federal Government’s Balancing 
of Policies  
The Court in Arizona recognized that “a principal feature of the 
removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials,” 
which in turn “embraces immediate human concerns.”162 DACA reflects the 
federal government’s use of broad discretion to “embrace immediate human 
concerns” by using federal policy to prevent the marginalization of qualified 
young undocumented immigrants. Moreover, the Court in Hines emphasized 
that the federal immigration system seeks to “protect the personal liberties of 
law-abiding aliens . . . and to leave them free from the possibility of 
inquisitorial practices and police surveillance that might not only affect our 
international relations but might also generate the very disloyalty which the 
law has intended guarding against.”163  The Court in Arizona echoed the 
concerns raised in Hines and struck down the provision of S.B. 1070 
allowing arrest without a warrant.164 
The executive branch is permitted to use its decision-making power 
to balance a number of factors within the executive branch’s expertise.165 
The Napolitano memorandum states the DACA program is an exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion designed to prevent the removal of “productive 
young people to countries where they may not have lived or even speak the 
                                                        
160 See infra Part III. 
161 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505. 
162 Id. at 2499 (emphasis added) (noting this prosecutorial discretion is rooted in 8 
U.S.C. § 1103(a)); see Immigrant Laws, supra note 90. 
163 Hines, 312 U.S. at 74 (emphasis added). 
164 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506 (noting federal immigration law seeks to prevent 
the “unnecessary harassment of some aliens (for instance, a veteran, college student, or 
someone assisting with a criminal investigation) whom federal officials determine should not 
be removed”). 
165 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831. 
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language.”166 The federal government acknowledged that DACA grantees 
entered the U.S. without authorization, but did so “[without intent] to 
violate” immigration law, by providing DACA grantees only lawful 
presence, not lawful status. 167  As such, the DACA program carefully 
balances the government’s need to remove “high priority” criminals, while 
also integrating “low priority” undocumented individuals who entered the 
U.S. without fault and have developed ties to the U.S.  
The N.C. licenses undercut the Obama administration’s balancing of 
policy goals to integrate DACA grantees and removing high priority 
criminals. The N.C. licenses prominently display DACA grantees’ lack of 
permanent immigration status. The N.C. licenses overemphasize DACA 
grantee’s lack of immigration status while ignoring the federal government’s 
plan to integrate such individuals. Despite being technically accurate, “NO 
LAWFUL STATUS” in bold red letters on the license intentionally 
differentiates DACA grantees. Such an action reinforces the outsider status 
of DACA grantees. 168  In highlighting the DACA grantee’s precarious 
immigration status, North Carolina limits the number and size of the 
communities to which immigrants without lawful status can belong.169 In 
turn, this creates a risk that DACA grantees will not apply for driver’s 
licenses for fear of exposing their immigration status, which would frustrate 
the government’s goal of bringing DACA grantees, productive young 
immigrants, out of the shadows. Thus, the N.C. licenses disproportionately 
focus on a DACA grantee’s lack of formal immigration status, which 
compromises the government’s goal of discreet integration.  
The Court in Arizona acknowledged the complex interaction 
between a removable individual’s ties to the community and the impact of 
removal orders on broader U.S. foreign policy.170 Indeed, removal decisions, 
including the selection of a removed alien’s destination, may implicate the 
U.S. relations with foreign powers and require consideration of changing 
political and economic circumstances.171 The dynamic nature of relations 
with other countries requires the executive branch to ensure immigration 
enforcement policies are consistent with U.S. foreign policy.172 Similarly, the 
                                                        
166 Napolitano, supra note 3, at 2; see also Martin, supra note 95 (addressing the 
broad discretion that DHS and ICE enjoy in enforcing immigration law against removable 
individuals and noting that such discretion is common across all enforcement agencies). 
167 Napolitano, supra note 3, at 3. 
168 López, supra note 17, at 104 (suggesting licenses like the N.C. license single 
out the license holders, thus violating Equal Protection rights). Though Professor López uses 
Equal Protection analysis, given the Court’s language in Arizona, the protection of a group of 
undocumented immigrants can be a broad goal of federal action. Id. 
169 See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
2037, 2079 (2008). 
170 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499. 
171 Id. (citations omitted).  
172 Id. 
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Court in Crosby noted that the executive branch had broad discretion in the 
development of foreign policy.173 
Given the Court’s broad deference to the federal government’s 
control over foreign policy in Arizona, the N.C. licenses would disrupt the 
government’s foreign policy goals. The DACA program reflects the federal 
government’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion in favor of young 
individuals who should not be removed to “countries where they may not 
have lived or even speak the language.”174 As such, the federal government is 
ensuring that a class of individuals who will have difficulty in reintegrating 
in their country of origin will not be removed. Conversely, the federal 
government seeks to facilitate individuals’ integration into the U.S., the 
country to which many of the affected individuals feel most connected. The 
N.C. licenses undermine the integration of such individuals, which in turn, 
compromises the Obama administration’s overall foreign policy goals. 
Additionally, the N.C. licenses place undue attention on a DACA 
grantee’s unlawful status, thereby putting them at risk of removal or 
unnecessary detention. The impact of N.C. licenses on federal objectives can 
be illustrated by examination of a hypothetical N.C. license holder who 
encounters local law enforcement. Theoretically, a N.C. license holder can 
be stopped pursuant to a “show me your papers” law or can otherwise be 
stopped for any reason. If a N.C. license holder is stopped by local law 
enforcement, he or she also faces the risk of encountering the § 287(g) or S-
COMM detainer programs.  
First, assuming the hypothetical DACA grantee is stopped pursuant 
to a “show me your papers” law, the N.C. licenses ostensibly would be                                                         
173 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381. The opinion states: 
 [T]he state Act undermines the President’s capacity, in this instance 
for effective diplomacy. It is not merely that the differences between the 
state and federal Acts in scope and type of sanctions threaten to 
complicate discussions; they compromise the very capacity of the 
President to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other 
governments. 
Id. An example of the interaction between immigration and U.S. foreign policy is illustrated 
by the relationship between the U.S. and China. In 1990, Congress debated whether to permit 
Chinese students to remain in the U.S. because of persecution in China. China, in response, 
accused the U.S. of interfering with its affairs, creating tension between the two nations and 
within the political parties in the U.S. See Kenneth J. Franzblau, Immigration’s Impact on U.S. 
National Security and Foreign Policy, U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM 2 (Oct. 1997), 
www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/respapers/ii-oct97.pdf; Jim Mann, House Votes to Override Bush on 
Chinese Students, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25, 1990), articles.latimes.com/1990-01-25/news/mn-
966_1_chinese-students. More recently, the U.S., through both its immigration policies and 
foreign policies, is competing directly with China for talented, highly educated individuals. 
Peter Ford, Reverse Brain Drain: China Engineers Incentives for “Brain Gain”, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 21, 2012), www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-Issues/2012/1021/Reverse-
brain-drain-China-engineers-incentives-for-brain-gain/%28page %29/2. In both instances, the 
federal government is making decisions about immigration policy and foreign policy to best 
deal with diplomatic relations with China.  
174 Napolitano, supra note 3, at 2; see also Martin, supra note 147, at 181–83. 
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sufficient documentation that a DACA grantee is “lawfully present.”175 But, 
the N.C. license would subject a DACA grantee to heightened police 
scrutiny, as the licenses would alert local law enforcement of the DACA 
grantees’ lack of formal immigration status. In which case, the local police 
may choose to spend time checking with DHS to confirm the N.C. license 
holder’s legal presence. Such a process would be an inefficient use of federal 
resources because the federal government has already deemed these people 
legally present. This inefficiency frustrates the federal policy to focus 
resources on the prosecution and removal of “high priority” criminals, not 
wasting law enforcement resources on “low priority” undocumented 
immigrants.176 
In the § 287(g) and S-COMM context, N.C. licenses may increase 
the risk of wrongful detention of DACA grantees. Generally, USCIS has 
stated that any information obtained to determine whether an applicant 
qualifies for DACA may be shared with national security and law 
enforcement agencies, including ICE, for purposes other than removal.177 
Information may be shared with ICE for national security purposes, such as 
for the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense.178 Essentially, a 
DACA applicant’s information is not relayed to ICE unless USCIS deems it 
necessary because the applicant represents a threat to national security. 
The N.C. licenses raise the concerns addressed by the Court in 
Arizona because the federal government’s immigration enforcement policy 
to avoid police surveillance and “unnecessary harassment” would be 
undermined.179 Post-arrest federal prosecutorial discretion does not remedy 
an individual’s initial interaction with local law enforcement.180 By exposing 
DACA grantees’ immigration status on N.C. licenses, local law enforcement 
in North Carolina and in other states risk wrongfully detaining DACA 
grantees for § 287(g) and S-COMM purposes. While most states have phased 
out the § 287(g) program, S-COMM has filled the void.181 
There are numerous reports of errors in the § 287(g) and S-COMM 
databases, which have led to the improper detainment of individuals with 
legal status. 182  While the N.C. licenses provide proof of identity, they 
exacerbate DHS database errors by alerting local law enforcement to an 
individual’s “unlawful status” which places a DACA grantee through                                                         
175 See, e.g., S.B. 1070 § 2(B); H.B. 786 § 15A-506. 
176 DACA grantees are especially “low priority” individuals because a grantee 
must demonstrate that he or she does not have any significant criminal history to qualify for 
DACA protection. 
177 USCIS FAQ, supra note 32. 
178 Id. 
179 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506. 
180 Motomura, supra note 56, at 1856. 
181 See supra text accompanying notes 53, 57; see supra Part II.A. 
182 Michele Waslin, The Secure Communities Program: Unanswered Questions 
and Continuing Concerns, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER (Nov. 2010), http://elpasotimes. 
typepad.com/files/secure_communities _updated_110410-1.pdf. 
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needless § 287(g) and S-COMM checks despite his or her legal presence.183 
This in turn frustrates the facilitation of legally justifiable detention of 
individuals who, in contrast, do present a risk to the community. 
Assuming a hypothetical N.C. license holder is stopped for a minor 
traffic offense, local law enforcement may read the language of the N.C. 
licenses and feel compelled to check the immigration status of the license 
holder, even though DACA grantees are protected from removal. As such, 
ICE would waste resources on DACA grantees put into § 287(g) and S-
COMM checks when DHS has already declared its exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion. The possibility of such waste increases in a situation where a N.C. 
license holder travels to a state where DACA grantees are either not issued 
licenses, such as Arizona,184or a state where DACA driver’s licenses are not 
as conspicuously marked as the N.C. licenses.185 Furthermore, such action 
risks “generat[ing] the very disloyalty” DACA seeks to avoid.186 Therefore, 
the N.C. licenses would disrupt the federal government’s policy goals. 
 
2. North Carolina License Holders Face Danger in Arizona Because of 
Arizona’s Policy Not to Recognize DACA Grantees’ Lawful Presence 
 
Most troubling is how a N.C. license holder would fare in 
Arizona.187 Governor Brewer has steadfastly maintained DACA grantees are 
not lawfully present. 188  Governor Brewer chose to ignore recent DHS 
guidance reiterating that DACA grantees are lawfully present in the U.S.189                                                         
183 Id. 
184 See infra Part IV.B.2.  
185 The differing policies of states regarding DACA grantees’ drivers licenses can 
cause reciprocity and consistency problems between states and result in difficulties for law 
enforcement imposing out-of-state laws and also for states following state-specific reciprocity 
agreements. See AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS, DRIVER LICENSING FOR 
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN 2013: HOW STATES ARE REACTING AND THE EFFECTS ON THE 
MOTOR VEHICLE COMMUNITY 4–8 (Nov. 20, 2013). 
186 Individuals who qualify for DACA must have entered the U.S. before they 
turned sixteen and may not be older than thirty-one. See supra text accompanying note 31. 
Consequently, many DACA grantees are in the U.S. during a vital time during the brain and 
emotional development process. Researchers are hoping to study the effect that undocumented 
status has on young individuals. Erika L. Sanchez, Studies Hope to Show the Emotional Toll 
on Children of Undocumented Immigrants, NBC (Mar. 25, 2013), nbclatino.com/2013/ 
03/25/studies-hope-to-show-the-emotional-toll-on-children-of-undocumented-immigrants/. 
This paper extrapolates and assumes that living “in the shadows” as second class citizens can 
cause the type of effects that the researchers are studying. In which case, resentment and a 
refusal to make meaningful contributions to the U.S. caused by psychological and emotional 
stress of “living in the shadows” is the type of “disloyalty” that this paper envisions.  
187 See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., supra note 8 (noting, in addition to 
Arizona, Nebraska has expressly stated that it would not issue DACA grantees driver’s 
licenses). 
188 Arizona Governor Brewer: Decision Denying Licenses Stands, KTAR NEWS 
(Feb. 11 2013), ktar.com/22/1609469/Brewer-Decision-denying-licenses-stands; see supra 
note 20.  
189 USCIS FAQ, supra note 32. 
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Arizona is unique in that, unlike other states, it does not recognize the legal 
presence of DACA grantees.190 Thus, Arizona’s “show me your papers” law 
would have an even bigger impact on N.C. license holders than other states’ 
“show me your papers” laws. 
Arizona residents who are DACA grantees cannot receive driver’s 
licenses.191 As such, Arizona DACA grantees who are stopped by local law 
enforcement pursuant to S.B. 1070 must present notices from DHS or USCIS 
to verify their immigration status. This in turn results in significant pressure 
on DACA grantees who are protected from removal under federal law, but 
are powerless when stopped pursuant to Arizona’s “show me your papers” 
law. There are reports that Arizona law enforcement has arrested DACA 
applicants for not presenting a driver’s license. 192  Generally, in the 
immigration law context, individuals with a pending application for status 
are protected from removal. 193  Thus, while DACA applicants are not 
afforded the full protections provided to DACA grantees, they are 
temporarily non-removable while their application is pending.  
Cesar Valdes’ arrest is an anecdotal example of the impact of 
Arizona’s policy. Cesar Valdes was arrested and detained by Arizona police 
for violating Arizona’s “show your papers” law when he failed to a produce 
a driver’s license during a traffic-related stop despite his status as a DACA 
applicant. 194  He was finally released after being transferred to ICE 
custody.195 
The N.C. license demonstrates that an individual is a qualified 
DACA grantee. In Arizona, where the lawful status of DACA grantees is not 
recognized, the N.C. license will not offer any protection from local law 
enforcement. Unlike Cesar Valdes, a N.C. license holder possesses a driver’s 
license and is an actual DACA grantee. Given that Arizona does not 
recognize the lawful presence of DACA grantees, it is not certain that 
owning a license proclaiming “NO LAWFUL STATUS” would be any better 
than not owning a license.196 After all, the N.C. licenses clearly state that the 
license holder does not have “lawful status” in the U.S., and Arizona does 
not recognize a DACA grantee’s “legal presence.” It is highly likely that if a                                                         
190 As previously noted, Nebraska is the only other state besides Arizona that does 
not recognize DACA grantees as having legal presence in the U.S. See supra note 8. 
191 Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2012-06.  
192  Carmen Cornejo, DACA Field Report: When DACA and SB 1070 Collide, 
ILW.COM BLOGS (Nov. 20, 2012, 5:40 AM), http://blogs.ilw.com/dacafieldreport/ 
2012/11/when-daca-and-sb1070-collide.html. 
193 Morton Memo, supra note 139; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. of ICE, 
on Guidance Regarding the Handling of Removal Proceedings of Aliens with Pending or 
Approved Applications or Petitions (Aug. 2, 2010) (terminating removal proceedings of 
persons with pending applications for status in certain instances); see also DREAM Relief: 
FAQs Other Immigration Cases Robert Menendez, http://www.menendez.senate.gov/ 
issues/dream-relief-faqs-other-immigration-cases (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).  
194 See supra note 190. 
195 Id. 
196 Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2012-06. 
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N.C. license holder were stopped or arrested by Arizona law enforcement, 
the N.C. license would not prevent the Arizona officers from detaining the 
license holder for § 287(g) and S-COMM purposes. Indeed, local police did 
not respect Cesar Valdes’s right to protection from unnecessary detention as 
a DACA applicant with a pending application. Instead, he was needlessly 
kept in police custody before being released by ICE.197 The Arizona policy to 
not recognize DACA status is at odds with federal policy to focus 
immigration enforcement efforts on high priority individuals. Cesar Valdes’s 
experience highlights how the N.C. licenses expose DACA grantees to the 
risk of prolonged detention when Arizona law enforcement chooses to utilize 
§ 287(g) and S-COMM.  
By exposing DACA grantees and putting them at such a risk, the 
N.C. licenses directly conflict with the federal goal of integrating DACA 
grantees into American society. The licenses wrongly emphasize DACA 
grantees’ lack of legal status, making them a target for unnecessary law 
enforcement attention rather than facilitating their social integration. 
Moreover, the N.C. licenses impede the federal government’s policy of 
resource allocation, as the licenses enhance the risk of DACA grantees going 
through § 287(g) and S-COMM background checks even when the DACA 
grantees have not been convicted of a crime and are legally present in the 
U.S., therefore are not removable. The N.C. licenses, particularly in 
confluence with Governor Brewer’s executive order and S.B. 1070, are an 
obstacle to the federal policy of protecting DACA grantees from removal.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The N.C. licenses undermine the DACA program’s objective to 
integrate individuals who are “Americans in every single way but one: on 
paper.” 198  In Arizona, the Supreme Court emphasized the federal 
government’s “broad discretion” to “embrace immediate human concerns” in 
immigration enforcement, grounded in the executive branch’s constitutional 
powers.199  
The language used on the licenses, despite accurately stating DACA 
grantees’ immigration status, frustrates the federal government’s attempts to 
“embrace immediate human concerns” by publicizing the DACA grantees’ 
status. Indeed, the Obama administration sought to fully integrate DACA 
grantees into the U.S. by making public benefits available to them, like 
driver’s licenses. The N.C. licenses impede integration by highlighting the 
precarious immigration status of DACA grantees and exposing them to 
heightened scrutiny by law enforcement. Moreover, N.C. licenses place 
DACA grantees at risk for being detained for § 287(g) and S-COMM                                                         
197 See supra note 187. 
198 Cushman & Preston, supra note 5. 
199 Martin, supra note 147, at 186. 
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purposes, particularly in states like Arizona, despite the government’s 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. As a result, the N.C. licenses conflict 
with federal policy and disrupt the federal government’s resource allocation. 
Thus, the N.C. licenses are obstacle preempted and should be rescinded.  
Currently, North Carolina driver’s licenses issued to people with 
non-immigrant visas already discreetly state the temporary validity period of 
the licenses on the back of the licenses without conspicuously highlighting 
the cardholder’s specific immigration status. 200  Discreetly placing such 
information on DACA grantees’ driver’s licenses would not draw attention 
to their “unlawful status.” In doing so, DACA grantees’ driver’s licenses will 
contain the same information as other noncitizens. This would lower the risk 
that DACA grantees will be wrongfully subjected to § 287(g) or S-COMM 
programs and would conform with the federal government’s goal to integrate 
DACA grantees. Therefore, North Carolina should include DACA grantees 
in its current licensing scheme for noncitizens in lieu of the N.C. licenses 
emphasizing their lack of lawful status. 
                                                        
200 Gutierrez, supra note 11. 
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